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THE AGE RESTRICTED RESIDENCE:
LEGITIMATE EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
FOR THE FUTURE
By Dallas Holmes* and John E. Brown**
I. INTRODUCTION
California law has infused the local zoning power with substantial
elasticity. In a landmark zoning decision, the California Supreme
Court stated that the zoning power must be based upon "the capacity
... to meet the reasonable current requirements of time and place and
period in history .... I" A relatively new and increasingly important
requirement of our own time, place, and period is the growing desire of
adult citizens to seek out, move into, and protect the existence of age
restricted residences.
As our population matures and the relative political power of the
senior citizen increases, this trend will probably continue unless
checked. Adults-only apartments and age restrictive zoning and cove-
nants have been challenged as violating the constitutional rights of an-
other interest group--families with children. The resulting struggle
might lead to an unusual legal confrontation between two groups of
potential residents both of whom argue that the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare would be better promoted by the protection of
their interest group.
This article explores the interplay between traditional concepts of
exclusionary zoning and current attempts to institute or prevent age
restricted zones, covenants, or apartment houses. Recent California
legislative and judicial efforts are analyzed, and trends are predicted
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1. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 370 P.2d
342, 346, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642 (1962).
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and evaluated. Our conclusion is that both the United States and Cali-
fornia Constitutions permit property owners to restrict use of their
property on the basis of age. In the absence of preemption, local gov-
ernments are free to legislate for or against age restrictions according to
their determinations of the requirements of the public interest and the
general welfare.
Ii. THE POWER TO ZONE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE
The power to zone finds its origins in the legal concept of sover-
eignty-that is, the right of the sovereign to regulate the affairs of men
and things as they come together in the polis.2 Thus, it is not surprising
that contemporary legal interpretations of the zoning power have been
expansive. Because government derives from its sovereignty the power
to regulate the interaction of men and things, the urban environment is
a logical focal point for the application of new land use restrictions
designed to shape the character of that environment. On the basis of
this historically recognized right of the sovereign to adopt and enforce
all laws necessary to conduct and maintain effective government, courts
have developed a gradual and progressive expression of approval for
innovative applications of the police power, including the zoning
power, to address broader social policies.3
The police power originates in the sovereign power which enables
government to adopt and enforce all laws necessary to protect and fur-
ther the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citi-
zens.4 Not surprisingly, as America's commercial and agrarian urban
2. The word "polis" is the Greek term for "city" and is the origin of the word "police."
3. See, for example, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 162 (1778), defining police
power as "the due regulation and domestic order of the Kingdom: whereby the individuals
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general
behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood and good manners; to be decent,
industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations."
For examples of the broadening of this historical concept, see I P. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.03[2] (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN].
4. See generally 6 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24, at
412 (3d ed. 1976) for an exhaustive treatment of the development of the police power [here-
inafter cited as MCQUILLIN].
In the seminal zoning case of Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381
(1925), the California Supreme Court set forth the expansive nature of the police power:
The police power of a state is an indispensable prerogative of sovereignty and one
that is not to be lightly limited. Indeed, even though at times its operation may
seem harsh, the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon
its existence save that it be not unreasonably and arbitrarily invoked and ap-
plied.... [A]s a commonwealth develops politically, economically, and socially,
the police power likewise develops, within reason, to meet the changed and chang-
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centers began to industrialize in the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the police power as applied through zoning laws developed into a
convenient tool to fight urban deterioration. Municipal power was ex-
ercised on an increasing scale during this time to protect the urban citi-
zenry from the perceived negative effects of industrial, commercial,
business, and occupational uses intruding upon formerly residential
neighborhoods.
The earliest form of zoning regulations were therefore essentially
designed to redress improper interference with one type of land use by
another. As industry and residential urban concentrations increased,
city dwellers found themselves increasingly deprived of quiet, sunlight,
clean air, and the other amenities which had been historically associ-
ated with the agrarian market town. The nineteenth century English
economic pragmatism that fostered this urbanization found its perfect
expression in the concept that those activities that do not foster good
business do not deserve attention. However, the encouragement of ur-
ban industry, commerce, trade, and occupations ultimately had conse-
quences which led to calls for local governmental regulation to protect
the urban public.5
Although directed to the control or containment of noxious uses of
land, early land use regulations were based chiefly on common law nui-
sance concepts. Such nuisance concepts were inspired by the fact that
concentrated groups of persons carrying on a number of commercial,
industrial, and residential activities within the confines of a densely
populated urban area tended to create public annoyances. These con-
cepts eventually led to regulations that restricted building height, mass,
and number of stories to insure that adequate light and air would enter
urban dwellings.6 Because the common law doctrine of nuisance was
ing conditions. What was at one time regarded as an improper exercise of the
police power may now, because of changed living conditions, be recognized as a
legitimate exercise of that power. . . Thus it is apparent that the police power is
not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of
knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for its application, capa-
ble of expansion to meet existing conditions of modem life, and thereby keep pace
with the social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the human race.
Id. at 484-85, 234 P. at 383.
5. At least one critic asserts that the use segregation concepts of early zoning measures
actually encouraged urban deterioration. J. AVANGO, THE URBANIZATION OF THE EARTH
73-77 (1970). For an additional criticism of zoning as a land use control, see Note, Land Use
Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning anda ProposedAlternative, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 335 (1972).
6. In an early nuisance case, a New York court noted:
It is a well-recognized fact that in large communities, which are closely built up
and inhabited by the working class to a large extent, a quantity of smoke dis-
1980]
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used as one of the principal methods of controlling land use in the early
twentieth century, the first zoning ordinances divided land into differ-
ent districts and permitted only certain uses within each zoning district.
Following the lead of the legislatures, courts in turn initially relied on
nuisance analogies in reviewing such ordinances and defining the legit-
imate ends of zoning.7
Among the first zoning ordinances enacted in the United States
were those of the District of Columbia and the City of New York.8 The
New York Building Zone Resolution, which became the model for sev-
eral other cities, divided New York City into use, height, and area dis-
tricts. While there is a close relationship between this early type of
charged into the air from factories is most objectionable and offensive; rendering
the air disagreeable and injurious to breathe, injuring clothes, textiles, and numer-
ous other articles, and otherwise causing inconvenience and annoyance to those
subjected thereto. Ordinances aimed at this evil have frequently been upheld, and
there can be no question but what it is the subject of municipal control and regula-
tion.
Department of Health v. Ebling Brewing Co., 38 Misc. 537, 541, 78 N.Y.S. 11, 13 (1902).
See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927) (set-back); Welsh v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79
N.E. 745 (1907). In California, "[alnything is a nuisance which obstructs the free use of
property so as to interfere with its comfortable enjoyment. ... Los Angeles Brick & Clay
Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. 2d 478, 486, 141 P.2d 46, 51 (1943).
7. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in which the
Supreme Court stated:
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find
their jurisdiction in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public wel-
fare. The line in which this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate as-
sumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with
circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be
clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to
rural communities. In solving doubts, the maxim sic utere uo ut alienum non
laedas, [use your own property in such manner as not to injure another], which lies
at the foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will fur-
nish a fairly helpful clew. And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted,
not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the
process of ascertaining the scope of, the power. Thus the question whether the
power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or of a particu-
lar use, like the question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be deter-
mined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the local-
ity. . . . A nuisance may merely be a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in
a parlor instead of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for
zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control. ...
Id. at 387-88.
8. A zoning resolution was passed by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment of
New York City on July 25, 1916, pursuant to ch. 466, law of 1901, as amended by ch. 470 of
law of 1914 and as further amended by ch. 497 of law of 1916.
Zoning Regulations of the District of Columbia were adopted under Acts of Congress
of March 1, 1920 and June 20, 1938. Code 1940, §§ 5-412 to -425. Wood v. District of
Columbia, 39 A.2d 67, 68 n.1 (D.C. 1944).
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zoning and laws prohibiting nuisances, the zoning power is not nearly
as limited in its purposes today and may deal with many uses of prop-
erty which are not physically detrimental to surrounding property own-
ers.
9
Because the power to zone is historically derived from the police
power, contemporary articulations of the permissible aims of this police
power have assisted courts in broadening interpretations of the legiti-
mate aims of zoning. In California, cities and counties are permitted
by the state's constitution to make and enforce within their limits any
local police, sanitary, or other regulations not in conflict with general
law.' ° This provision has been implemented by state statute to "pro-
vide for the adoption and administration of zoning laws, ordinances,
rules and regulations by counties and cities. . . ."I The state legisla-
ture in the same section indicates its intent "to provide only a minimum
of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maxi-
mum degree of control over local zoning matters."' 2
In the spirit of this authority, California courts have adopted a
liberal attitude towards review of local zoning ordinances. The zoning
power, just as the police power from which it originated, is viewed in
California as a dynamic, progressive, and flexible tool possessing an
elasticity of application necessary to meet and seek resolution of new
societal problems.
In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,' 3 the
9. Typical zoning ordinances today include regulation of walls, fences, landscaping, lot
coverage, vehicular and pedestrian access, off-street parking, outdoor living space, trash, and
storage areas, recreational facilities and lot size, as well as building height and mass. For
examples of two typical zoning ordinances, see Title 17 of the Corona, California, Municipal
Code and Article IX, Article 1 of the Orange, California, Municipal Code. See also Gig-
noux v. Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950), and Dukeminier, Zoningfor
Aesthetic Objectives." A Reappraisal, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955). For an early
judicial leap beyond the traditional limits of the police power when reviewing a zoning
ordinance, see Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 316-17, 295 P. 14, 20 (1930).
10. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800 (Deering 1979).
12. Id.
13. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962). As the court there noted:
[Elarly zoning cases laid down the broad pattern of the rules by which the constitu-
tionality of such legislation is to be tested in the courts. Thus, in Euclid v. Ambler
Realy Co.,. .. 272 U.S. at page 387, Mr. Justice Sutherland speaking for that
court, said:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sus-
tained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitray and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained,
under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those
which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles
1980]
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California Supreme Court found the origin of this broad principle of
flexibility in the early zoning case of Euclid v. Ambler Really Co.,'4 in
which the United States Supreme Court first upheld use classifications
as valid police power efforts to protect the public health, safety, moral-
ity, and welfare. The broadly articulated principles of furthering the
general welfare outlined by the Consolidated Rock court are used to
delimit the zoning power in California today.' 5 Because the zoning
power is considered by California courts to be necessary to assure a
capacity to "meet existing conditions of modern life," a zoning ordi-
nance is usually upheld if it has "a reasonable relation to the public
welfare."' 6
The expanded judicial standards articulated by the California
Supreme Court and used to sustain broad general welfare objectives is
most recently illustrated in Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore 7 in which the court concluded:
In deciding whether a challenged ordinance reasonably re-
lates to the public welfare, the courts recognize that such ordi-
nances are presumed to be constitutional, and come before the
court with every intendment in their favor. . . . "The courts
may differ with the zoning authorities as to the 'necessity or
propriety of an enactment,' but so long as it remains a 'ques-
tion upon which reasonable minds might differ,' there will be
no judicial interference with the municipality's determination
of policy."'"
Because the traditional concept of the general welfare in land use
regulation has been given an expansive interpretation by both the
and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally
arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for
while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their opera-
tion. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.
Id. at 521-22, 370 P.2d at 346, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
The court goes on to quote from the other landmark California zoning case, Miller v.
Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925): "[T]here is nothing known
to the law which keeps more in step with human progress than does the exercise of [the
police] power." 57 Cal. 2d at 522, 20 P.2d at 346, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (quoting Streitch v.
Board of Educ., 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779 (1914)).
14. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
15. 8 McQuILLIN, supra note 4, § 25.35 at 87-88.
16. Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 202 P.2d 38, 42 (1949).
17. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
18. Id. at 604-05, 557 P.2d at 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
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United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court, the
objectives necessary to sustain a zoning ordinance are no longer limited
to the elimination of public nuisances, noxious activities, or dangerous
structures.' 9 Even the earliest California decisions in this area referred
to broad notions of "public interest," "comfort," "convenience," and
"prosperity."20 The California Supreme Court in Miller v. Board of
Public Works,2 for example, refers to the "aggregate welfare" of soci-
ety's constituent members as one reflection of the general welfare.
22
In more recent years, various judicial decisions have upheld an
19. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). See also 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 4,
§ 25.20 at 52-53:
The meaning of the term "public welfare" may not be set down with exacti-
tude. The words "comfort, convenience, welfare and prosperity are somewhat
speculative; they are not susceptible of precise definition." Indeed, in the context
in which they are here considered, these terms necessarily are of uncertain import,
since they relate to the broadest purpose of governmental power, upon which any
final limitation must be constitutional and not merely by judicial definitions.
Generally, however, it appears that under circumstances of particular cases,
public welfare includes public convenience, general prosperity, the greatest welfare
of the public, all the great public needs, "what is sanctioned by usage or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immedi-
ately necessary," whatever is required for the public good, the suppression of all
things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society, and finally all regulations
which promote the general interest and prosperity of the public. Thus, for exam-
ple, providing employment may be regarded as one of the several sociological fac-
tors which, for purposes of zoning legislation, collectively comprise the general
welfare. Undoubtedly, the term does not embrace any conceivable object that a
legislative body might possibly deem to be for the public good.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. See cases cited at 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, §§ 25.18-.31 at 47-70.
21. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dsmissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926).
22. 195 Cal. at 493, 234 P. at 387. The court in upholding zoning which called for only
residential uses noted as follows:
[W]e think it may be safely and sensibly said that justification for residential zon-
ing may, in the last analysis, be rested upon the protection of the civic and social
values of the American home. The establishment of such districts is for the general
welfare because it tends to promote and perpetuate the American home. It is axio-
matic that the welfare, and indeed the very existence, of a nation depends upon the
character and caliber of its citizenry. The character and quality of manhood and
womanhood are in a large measure the result of home environment. The home
and its intrinsic influences are the very foundation of good citizenship, and any
factor contributing to the establishment of homes and the fostering of home life
doubtless tends to the enhancement, not only of community life, but of the life of
the nation as a whole.
... [F]ew persons, if given their choice, would, we think, deliberately prefer
to establish their homes and rear their children in an apartment house neighbor-
hood rather than in a single home neighborhood. The general welfare of a com-
munity is but the aggregate welfare of its constituent members, and that which
tends to promote the welfare of the individual members of society cannot fail to
benefit society as a whole.
Id. at 492-93, 234 P. at 386-87.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
expanded use of the zoning power to permit local communities to es-
tablish and preserve their neighborhood character or community life-
style.23 In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,4 a village ordinance
restricted land use to single-family dwellings, and prohibited occu-
pancy of these dwellings by more than two persons unrelated by blood,
adoption, or marriage. The United States Supreme Court found that
this ordinance had a proper zoning purpose and upheld its validity
against a claim that it violated the equal protection clause. The Court
held that the ordinance was in fact reasonable, and did bear a rational
relationship to a permissible state objective: the establishment and
preservation of a community lifestyle. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, declared that such zoning could be used to fashion a commu-
nity characterized as a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few,
and motor vehicles restricted," and to establish zones where "family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 5
One commentator has since suggested that the Belle Terre case can
be read as setting an important limitation on a community's power to
use zoning to preserve community character-that a zoning measure
may not rest solely on a judgment that certain sorts of people are in-
compatible with the character of the community. 6 Where such zoning
bears a tangible relationship to land use and does not exclude a tradi-
tionally protected suspect class such as a religious or ethnic minority, it
remains to be seen whether zoning measures will be upheld despite
their exclusion of persons viewed as incompatible with the commu-
nity's character. Indeed, where such a zoning measure is motivated by
a desire to protect a traditional relationship, such as that of the family,
it may be that objectives such as community character would justify the
exclusion of particular groups, such as the unrelated individuals ex-
cluded from Belle Terre.
The Belle Terre decision followed historical trends that have
greatly broadened permissible ends of the zoning power by refining the
23. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Moviematic Ind.
Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (1977); Houston v. Board of City
Comm'rs, 218 Kan. 323, 543 P.2d 1010 (1975). See also National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
24. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
25. Id. at 9.
26. See Note, Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1454-55 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Zoning]. This exhaustive student work provides an ex-
cellent review of case law in this area.
[Vol. 13
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traditional approach in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 27 that zoning aims
to protect the character of separate uses by keeping them separate. In
Belle Terre, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned land use con-
trols which went far beyond allowing a municipality to regulate the
type and use of structures to be constructed within it.28 In Belle Terre,
the Court found a rational basis for the village ordinance to exist
within the concept of general welfare where the zoning promoted the
community's desire to preserve a pleasant environment.
29
In Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills,30 a decision subsequent to
Belle Terre, the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to review a zoning
ordinance of the California town of Los Altos Hills, which provided
that a housing lot must be at least one acre in size, and that no such lot
could be occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit. The court
found that this type of zoning ordinance was rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interest of preserving a town's rural environ-
ment, and therefore did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 Similarly, in Construction Industry Associa-
tion v. City of Petaluma,32 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the con-
cept of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's
desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low den-
sity of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace."33 A
New York court has also upheld minimum lot zoning of two acres,
reasoning that the power to protect the general welfare included the
power to enact zoning measures designed to protect the appearance and
environment of a rural residential community. 4
Decisions such as Belle Terre, Town of Los Altos Hills, and
Petaluma suggest a general judicial willingness to sanction zoning ordi-
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
28. Use separation can rather easily be upheld under the reasoning of Euclid and its
progeny because commercial and industrial uses are generally thought to be incompatible
with residential uses. More recent cases have sustained aesthetics of a more refined nature
as a proper basis for exercise of the zoning power. See, e.g., Confederacion de la Raza
Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Suffolk Outdoor Advertis-
ing Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977), appeal dismissed,
439 U.S. 808 (1978). See also Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectiv-
ity, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1438; 3 ROHAN, supra note 3, at § 16.01.
29. 416 U.S. at 9.
30. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. Id. at 254.
32. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
33. Id. at 908-09.
34. Elbert v. Village of North Hills, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318, rev'don other grounds, 262
A.D. 856, 28 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1941). See also Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382
P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
1980]
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nances which enable a community to enhance and protect its chosen
character and desired lifestyle. However, it is equally clear that courts
remain concerned about the fact that zoning measures designed to pro-
mote community character can have exclusionary effects, even when
the general welfare is otherwise promoted through an aesthetically
pleasing environment. A number of commentators have recently ex-
amined zoning measures which have an exclusionary intent or effect,
and have generally concluded that courts are willing to limit the degree
to which community character can be used to support a zoning meas-
ure, if that measure has an exclusionary impact.35  For example, a
number of courts have recently invalidated zoning measures which ex-
clude lower income and minority groups. However, if such zoning is
protective of another judicially favored institution, such as the family,
it remains to be seen whether courts will sanction exclusionary zoning
measures largely motivated by general welfare objectives such as com-
munity character. 6
III. GENERAL WELFARE ZONING CAN BE BOTH
EXCLUSIONARY AND PERMISSIBLE
Exclusionary zoning is land use regulation which has economic,
social, or other segregation as its real purpose or as its actual result. As
an example, the restriction of land usage to lower population densities
can result in the exclusion of less affluent people from a community
because they cannot afford the cost of larger lot housing.37 Zoning
35. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969); Developments-Zoning,
supra note 26, at 1452-57; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 796-97 (1969). See also Comment, Exclusionary
Zoning in Caliorni 4 Statutory Mechanismfor Judicial Nondeference, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
1154 (1979).
36. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). See also Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to
Bind the Rights ofthe Whole World? 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REa. 234 (1973).
37. See Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974), in which the court
noted:
We consider it well-established that, from the community standpoint, there
are numerous practical and logical interests legitimately served by restrictive zon-
ing, particularly when the individual restrictions, e.g., minimum lot size, minimum
floor space and minimum frontage, are promulgated as part of a comprehensive
municipal planning and zoning scheme founded on lawful objectives. Communi-
ties cannot be condemned for seeking such ends as preservation of open space and
local "beauty," avoidance of heavy traffic congestion and overcrowded housing,
maintenance of property values, or even the stabilization of the burdens of spend-
ing for municipal services.
However, we are mindful that zoning has been used frequently for ends which
[Vol. 13
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measures intended to preserve a community's character by restricting
homes to one-acre lots encourage high cost residential development
which blocks or limits the influx of persons having low or moderate
incomes. These groups are in effect excluded, and the system of local
regulation which leads to such a result is called exclusionary zoning.
The purpose of this type of community character exclusionary
zoning often is the promotion of the health, safety, morals, or the gen-
eral welfare of the community. This argument was made by persons of
the Village of Belle Terre and the Town of Los Altos Hills, for exam-
ple, when they wished to adopt ordinances restricting occupancy of sin-
gle family zones to certain types of "family" units. As stated above,
this type of exclusionary zoning has been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.38
Legal attacks on zoning laws that have exclusionary effects have
been brought under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
39
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-tier approach
to zoning ordinances attacked under these clauses. Where a suspect
class (such as a racial minority) or a fundamental interest (such as the
vote) is affected, the Court casts the extremely heavy burden of proof
upon the government to show both that the law is necessary to the pro-
motion of a compelling state interest and that no less drastic means of
protecting that interest are available. Where neither a suspect class nor
a fundamental interest is involved, the Court applies a much less oner-
ous test. The party challenging the law bears the burden of showing
that it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,
and he "must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the chal-
while ostensibly within the traditional objectives of zoning-protection of health,
safety, morals and general welfare-are infact unrelated to those purposes.
Thus, the zoning power has been exercised, under the guise of community
planning, to prevent the construction of low-income housing in suburban, as distin-
guished from inner-city areas. The undeniable effect of such a restraint is the ex-
clusion of poor and moderate income families (and concomitantly, the exclusion of
ethnic and racial minorities) from desirable residential areas.
Id. at 745 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Frederic Strom calls age restrictive zoning "tantamount to official government policy of
segregation by age and to government telling citizens, albeit in a limited way, where they
may or may not live on the basis of their age." Strom, Age Restrictions in Land Use Control,
2 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 146 (1979).
38. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
39. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Town-
ship, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
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lenged [zoning] practices harm him ... "10
Traditionally, zoning classifications have been reviewed by courts
using the more lenient "rational basis" test. The California Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed its intention to continue to apply traditional
presumptions of validity to zoning ordinances in the case of Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore.4 There the court was asked to
review a zoning initiative ordinance which barred all residential devel-
opment pending resolution of community problems relating to educa-
tional facilities, sewage, and water supply. The court noted that this
zoning ordinance did not directly burden the right to travel (a funda-
mental interest) since it did not "penalize travel and resettlement but
merely [made] it more difficult for the outsider to establish his resi-
dence in the place of his choosing."42
Any effort to rezone portions of a city for only one age group
would also make it difficult for an outsider to locate in that city, but the
burden on the right to travel would be similarly indirect and therefore
these ordinances would be immune from strict scrutiny unless some
other "fundamental interest" or "suspect classification" is affected by
this type of exclusionary zoning. Zoning that creates areas reserved for
senior citizens or adults is exclusionary, because it involves a classifica-
tion based upon age. Such zoning also touches upon other individual
interests broadly referred to as the need for decent housing. However,
no case yet makes this classification suspect.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Taxpayers Association v. Wey-
mouth Townsho 43 held that age is not a suspect classification and that
housing is not a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment," and went on to fashion a theory sustaining such a measure's
40. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (emphasis in original). See Sager, Insular
Majorities Unabated- Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
91 HARV. L. RV. 1373 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
41. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). The court noted:
As commentators have observed, to insist that such zoning laws are invalid unless
the interests supporting the exclusion are compelling in character, and cannot be
achieved by an alternative method, would result in wholesale invalidation of land
use controls and endanger the validity of city and regional planning ...
Were a court to. . .hold that an inferred right of any group to live wher-
ever it chooses might not be abridged without some compelling state in-
terest, the law of zoning would be literally turned upside down;
presumptions of validity would become presumptions of invalidity and
traditional police powers of a state would be severely circumscribed. ...
Id. at 603, 557 P.2d at 485, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 603, 557 P.2d at 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
43. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
44. Id. at 281, 364 A.2d at 1034.
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relationship to the general welfare and to the regulation of land uses.45
The Weymouth decision suggests that the welfare of senior citizens is a
significant enough segment of the general welfare that protective zon-
ing in their behalf can be sustained. In the companion decision of
Shefpard v. Woodland Townshp Committee & Planning Board,4 6 the
same court upheld a zoning ordinance permitting senior citizen com-
munities as a special use exception in a residential-agricultural zone.47
The nexus between the need for adult housing and legitimate,
traditional land use regulation recognized by the Weymouth and Shep-
ard courts provides precedent for other courts to draw the conclusion
that such zoning measures can withstand attack.48 These two recent
New Jersey opinions, as well as the community character decisions in
Belle Terre, Town of Los Altos Hills, and Petaluma, lend considerable
authority to the conclusion that a carefully drafted zoning ordinance
which provides for an age restricted zone in a retirement community is
a valid exercise of the zoning power and is designed to promote the
general welfare. Further, it appears that any general, regional, or com-
munity plan for an area might itself determine that certain parts of that
area should have age restricted zoning. Under recent cases, this type of
finding would suggest that such zoning is reasonably related to regional
45. Id. at 289, 364 A.2d at 1040.
46. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
47. The Shepard court addressed itself specifically to the question of whether zoning
ordinances containing age qualifications "bear a real and substantial relationship to regula-
tion of land use," and concluded:
In asking us to strike these provisions, plaintiff would have us adopt a rigid and
inflexible rule invalidating all municipal ordinances which, in any way, transcend
regulation of the physical and structural aspects of land use and which collaterally
regulate those who may use the land. We decline to adopt such a narrow view of
the zoning power.
. . . [R]egulation of the use of land cannot, as a conceptual matter, be dissoci-
ated from regulation of the users of land ...
. .. It is thus obvious that age restrictions are both rationally related to the
concept of planned housing for the elderly and essential to the success of such
developments.
Id. at 246-47, 364 A.2d at 1013-14 (emphasis in original).
48. One astute and consistfently liberal observer of the Supreme Court's handling of ex-
clusionary zoning challenges so despairs of getting an ordinance overturned that he becomes
almost hysterical: "IT]he Court's willingness to evaluate land use policies under the due
process clause seems restricted to actual fits of municipal madness; mean and self-serving
acts of exclusion are apparently to be received as jeweled exercises of the police power.
. . . And majority will-however insular, unjust, or irrational-prevails." Sager, supra note
40, at 1421-25.
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and therefore general welfare.49 Moreover, it has been suggested that
age restricted communities may be justified because they serve inclusio-
nary as opposed to exclusionary ends.50 That age restricted communi-
ties would, on a larger scale, have a "rational relationship" to the goal
of providing adequate housing for senior citizens seems apparent. The
empirical data to this effect collected in Weymouth5" and Shepard52 is
substantial. Moreover, similar age restrictions on housing occupancy
have been upheld in various situations in other jurisdictions.53
Age restricted communities, although by their very nature limited
in their definition of the family, also foster and protect a traditional
American family institution, the retired couple or individual without
children. In this sense, such a use of the zoning power is not undercut
by the recent United States Supreme Court case of Moore v. City of
East Cleveland54 or the more recent New Jersey case of Slate v.
Baker." In Moore, the Supreme Court determined that there are lim-
its to the expansive interpretation of the zoning power that it had ar-
49. See Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975). As
the New York court stated:
The inclusionary, as distinguished from exclusionary, nature of such land use
is made clear by the town board's conclusion (1) that there is a present shortage for
housing for people when they get older, (2) that without the creation of the retire-
ment district that need will go unredressed, and (3) that ameliorating the need in
this way will impose no particular hardship on other groups of persons who suffer
from significant lack of housing. Certainly, when a community is impelled, consis-
tent with such criteria, to move to correct social and historical patterns of housing
deprivation, it is acting well within its delegated "general welfare" power.
Id. at 485-86, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 390. See Rose, Exclusionary Zoning in the
Federal Courts, 2 ZONING & PLANNING L. REFP. 137 (1979). See also Bailey v. Board of
Appeals, 370 Mass. 95, 345 N.E.2d 367 (1976). But see Hinman v. Planning & Zoning
Comm., 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (1965).
50. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 294, 364 A.2d 1016, 1040
(1976); Developments-Zoning, supra note 26, at 1633. See also I ROHAN, supra note 3,
§ 3.05[1] at 3-131. See generally Note, Survey of Municopal Corporations-Zoning to Permit
Creation of Districtsfor the Exclusive Use of the 4ged, 30 RuTGEPS L. REv. 740 (1977).
51. 71 N.J. at 267-69, 364 A.2d at 1026-27.
52. 71 N.J. at 239-41, 364 A.2d at 1010-12.
53. See Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (enforcing a restrictive
covenant against children in a mobile home subdivision, as "reasonably related to a legiti-
mate purpose" and therefore not a violation of equal protection); Maldini v. Ambro, 36
N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975) (zoning); Parrino v. Lindsay, 29
N.Y.2d 30, 272 N.E.2d 67, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1971) (rent increase exemption for elderly
tenants); Marino v. Ramapo, 68 Misc. 2d 44, 326 N.Y.S.2d 162, 183-85 (1971) (federally
subsidized housing). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(4) (1977) and 42 U.S.C. § 1485(d)(3)
(1977), which fix age related occupancy requirements for certain federally subsidized hous-
ing programs for the elderly.
54. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See Note, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio: The Emer-
gence of the Right of Family Choice in Zoning, 5 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 547 (1978).
55. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
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ticulated in Belle Terre. In Moore, the Court struck down a single
family zoning ordinance which so narrowly defined "family" as to pre-
vent close relatives from living together. A grandmother who violated
the ordinance was sentenced to jail for living with her grown son and
two grandsons. What distinguished Moore from the zoning ordinances
upheld by New Jersey's Supreme Court in Weymouth and Shepard was
the absence of any compelling justifications serving governmental in-
terests to justify the ordinance. The Court simply concluded that the
City of East Cleveland had failed to show a rational or proximate con-
nection between its ordinance and land use regulation.56
Moore's limits on the zoning power expansion approved by Belle
Terre, Weymouth, and Shepard do not appear to prevent the age re-
stricted community from intruding upon other forms of family life
where the age restriction is intended to serve the important general wel-
fare objectives set out in Weymouth and Shepard. Moreover, age re-
stricted zoning may be viewed as a means of protecting older persons
by permitting them to live in retirement communities or their own
homes. This rationale also preserves families, arid may therefore be
sufficient to justify zoning which has the subsidiary result of excluding
children. Age restricted zoning also responds to the special needs of the
older family unit by enabling elderly residents to maintain their social
homogeneity and chosen style of life. Such restrictions, even though
exclusionary, appear to be consistent with the protection afforded by
Moore to traditional relationships and the social institution of the fam-
ily.
IV. ZONING CONTROLS LAND USE BETTER THAN COVENANTS,
CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS
There are ways other than zoning to create age restrictions on resi-
dential property. For example, such restrictions can be effected by pri-
vate individuals through the use of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions. However, because of the inherent limits on the effective
use of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, zoning is a better way to
achieve such use restrictions.
Covenants are created by words in a deed or other writing that
56. 431 U.S. at 498-99. A remarkably consistent result occurred in State v. Baker, 81
N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979), when the New Jersey Supreme Court also decided under simi-
lar circumstances to limit at least indirectly the sweep of its own holdings in Weymouth and
Shefpard. See note 87 infra.
57. See generally 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, § 25.09 at 26-27.
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show agreement by a party to do or refrain from doing a certain
thing.5" A covenant is a promise regarding the use of land5 9 which is
binding on the covenantor and persons who may assume pursuant to
the obligation, and it benefits the covenantee and his assignees. The
original parties are in privity of contract,6" and their rights and obliga-
tions arise out of a contractual relationship. If a covenant is breached,
the person entitled to enforce the covenant has the legal remedy of
damages and under some circumstances an injunction to restrain or
abate the violation.6 Subsequent purchasers of the property are sub-
ject to the covenant only if the original covenant meets the requirement
of a "covenant running with the land."' 62 However, in some instances
the covenant that does not "run" can be enforced in equity as an equi-
table servitude as long as the grantee takes the property with notice.63
For an age restricted community to be created by the use of covenants,
all purchasers of property in the community would have to subscribe to
the covenants.
A condition may be used to impose restrictions on the use of the
land. The primary difference between a condition and a covenant is
that a condition is imposed only as a qualification of an estate when the
property is conveyed. Therefore, a breach of a condition often results
in forfeiture of the estate with a reversion to the previous owner,
64
while a breach of covenant is remedied by an injunction or damages.
As with the use of covenants, all property owners must subscribe to
those conditions if an age restricted area is to be established by use of
conditions.
Development plan restrictions have been widely used in connec-
tion with covenants and conditions. Together, they are often termed
"declarations of covenants, conditions and restrictions," or equitable
servitudes.65 They are most often imposed by a developer on land to be
58. O'Sullivan v. Griffith, 153 Cal. 502, 506, 95 P. 873, 875 (1908).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 16 (1977).
60. Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 184 Cal. 565, 569, 194 P. 1024, 1026 (1920); Smith
v. Mendonsa, 108 Cal. App. 2d 540, 542, 238 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1952).
61. Joyce v. Krupp, 83 Cal. App. 391, 398, 257 P. 124, 127 (1927); Barrows v. Jackson,
112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 538, 247 P.2d 99, 102 (1952).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1461-1468 (Deering 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 16 (1977).
63. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 687, 3 P.2d 927, 929 (1931) (citing several
cases).
64. Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 426, 74 P.2d 738, 740
(1937); City of Long Beach v. Marshall, I1 Cal. 2d 609, 613, 82 P.2d 362, 364 (1938); People
v. City of Long Beach, 200 Cal. App. 2d 609, 616-17, 19 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1962).
65. Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetary Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 101 P.2d 1099, 1103
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subdivided, and as long as it is clear in the original deeds to the tract
lots that the grantor intended that the covenants, conditions, and re-
strictions be for the benefit of all grantees, any lot owner may enforce
them. It is possible to use development plan restrictions to create an
age restricted area when the original tract is subdivided. However, this
method is ineffective in an established community of any size because
there is no practical way to assure that all subsequent owners will con-
sent.
Covenants, conditions, and restrictions have historically been
viewed as a private tool for use restriction,66 and as such, their enforce-
ment has proved difficult. Unless an individual or group of property
owners cares enough about a breaching neighbor to devote substantial
resources toward enjoining such a breach, there is no effective means
for redress. Further, as a subdivision matures, more and more resi-
dents may slide into enough violations of the original covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions that strict enforcement of each provision would
become impossible, even if one party wished to force the issue. The
original purposes of the neighborhood's founders are then lost beyond
the practical ability of our legal system to recall.67 On the other hand,
(1940); Warner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183, 183 P. 945, 949 (1919); Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 471, 474, 173 P.2d 573, 575 (1946).
66. See 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 4, at § 26.
67. There have been attempts recently in California to solve this enforcement problem
by making the public an express third party beneficiary to private covenants, conditions, and
restrictions. This is either done at the time of subdivision approval as a condition of the
tract or parcel map, or by separate agreement between the developer and the public agency.
In the latter instance, the following language may be added to the covenants, conditions, and
restrictions as recorded:
Pursuant to an agreement dated , the Association has agreed with
the City to (maintain common areas, enforce building materials restrictions, etc.) of
the Project in accordance with specified standards. If, in the opinion of the City
Manager, the Association at any time fails to perform in accordance with the terms
of the above-referenced Agreement, the City shall give written notice to the Associ-
ation specifying the exact nature of such deficiency. Such written notice of defi-
ciency from the City shall be addressed to the Association and shall require that
the Association take appropriate corrective action within - days of receipt of
such written notice, unless there exists a hazardous condition creating an immedi-
ate possibility of serious injury to persons or property, in which case the time for
correction may be reduced to a minimum of- days. The Association shall have
the right, within - days of receipt of such written notice of deficiency, to file an
appeal before the City's Council for a public hearing concerning the reasonable-
ness of the City's requirements as set forth in the written notice of deficiency. The
decision of the City Council on such appeal shall be binding upon all parties but
may be appealed by the Association through an appropriate action in any court
having jurisdiction. If the Association, within the time set forth in the Notice of
Deficiency (subject to extension for such time as may be required to appeal the
notice of deficiency to the City Council), does not undertake and complete the
corrective work required in the Notice, the City may undertake and complete such
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enforcement of zoning ordinances is usually accomplished by a public
agency, 68 and may result in criminal penalties. 69 Upon conviction, the
court may suspend or temper the sentence upon condition that the vio-
lation be cured, thus, in effect imposing a mandatory injunction on the
offender.
Even though zoning affects the entire populace, whereas cove-
nants, conditions, and restrictions may not, they all have contractual
overtones. The California Supreme Court recently commented on this
contractual aspect of zoning: "zoning. . .is similar in some respects to
a contract; each party foregoes rights to use its land as it wishes in re-
turn for the assurance that the use of neighboring property will be simi-
larly restricted, the rationale being that such mutual restriction can
enhance total community welfare." 0 In communities which decide to
impose age restrictions on themselves, it is imperative for the success of
the venture that all residents be parties. If there are residents who do
not meet the minimum age requirements, it is quite possible that the
value of living in such a community is decreased and may even be de-
stroyed for many residents who choose to live in the area because of its
age restrictions.
Neither covenants nor conditions are legally binding on individu-
als who are not parties to the establishing agreement. For these meth-
ods to be effective, virtually all community members would have to
corrective measures as are set forth in the Notice and assess the costs thereof
against the Association as a lien in the same manner as set forth herein for the
establishment of liens against Association property. The written notice of defi-
ciency from the City shall state the anticipated costs that the City would assess
against the Association for the corrective work to be accomplished, which costs
shall be no more than those charged by competitive private industry for similar
work.
While there is no specific California statute or case law authorizing public enforcement of
private restrictions, the authors believe that such enforcement, if challenged, would probably
be sustained on the same police power/general welfare basis discussed above.
68. A private party may sometimes enforce a zoning ordinance upon a showing of
greater injury than that suffered by the public generally. Hopkins v. McCullough, 35 Cal.
App. 2d 442, 454, 95 P.2d 950, 956 (1939); Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d
626, 643, 35 Cal. Rptr. 354, 365 (1963).
69. Violation of city or county zoning ordinances is traditionally a misdemeanor, al-
though in recent years in California a trend reducing such violations to infractions has de-
veloped. This trend is occurring to expedite enforcement. The penalty for an infraction can
only be a fine, and therdfore no trial by jury or public defender is available to the defendant.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 19c (Deering 1980). Experience shows courts are more willing to con-
vict and fine zoning ordinance violators than are juries, and city and county prosecutors are
willing to trade the lesser penalty for the greater certainty of conviction.
70. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506,
517, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 843 (1974).
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agree. Again, this is not practical in a large, established community.
Restrictions in the form of equitable servitudes would be effective, but
only in new developments where a common grantor can include restric-
tions in all the deeds. If an existing community desired to impose age
restrictions, equitable servitudes would be useless. Thus, the only alter-
native for an existing community is zoning. The local legislative body
could determine that the populace desired such restrictions and then
pass appropriate ordinances which would bind the entire community.
As stated above, zoning is also preferable due to the relative ease
of enforcement. Usually a local enforcement agency such as a district
attorney or city attorney prosecutes violations. Enforcement can be
brought about on an informal basis before filing a complaint. If this
proves unsuccessful, criminal penalties can be sought. Other alterna-
tives require private enforcement and resources in almost all cases, and
have usually proved impractical over time for that reason alone.
Zoning also provides a method by which exceptions can be
granted in unusual cases. A frequent criticism of age restrictive zoning
is that the residents would not be permitted to have their grandchildren
live with them should the parents of the grandchildren die. When the
zoning ordinance is drafted, it can contain provisions for such contin-
gencies by including a method by which variances can be granted in
these special circumstances. Absent any such provision, variances can
still be granted as the need arises.71 Exceptions, when needed, would
be harder to obtain if any of the alternative methods were chosen to
create an age restricted community. All are private agreements, and all
parties would have to consent to such exceptions. If one owner in a
tract governed by an equitable servitude refused to cooperate, it is
likely the person needing the exception would be unable to obtain it, at
least without incurring substantial litigation expense.
Finally, if after a period of time, the community decides that it no
longer desires age restrictions, a zoning ordinance can be easily re-
pealed or amended. Equitable servitudes in the form of covenants,
conditions, and restrictions are not as easy to rescind, because agree-
ment must be unanimous. Amending covenants, conditions, and re-
strictions would be virtually impossible if there is a large population in
the area affected. Zoning would permit a majority of an area's popula-
71. State law requires that variances to zoning ordinances be available under certain,
closely delineated circumstances. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (Deering 1980). See Essick v.
City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 614, 213 P.2d 492 (1950); Cf. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836
(1974).
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tion to determine the character of their community, while the use of the
alternatives may permit a small minority to dictate their concepts of
restricted uses to the rest of the community.
V. AGE RESTRICTED ZONING IN PRACTICE
As a society we are maturing, and as a people we are aging.72
While the trend has slowed somewhat in recent years, planners must
still face projections that twenty years hence the number of people in
the United States aged sixty years and older will be about forty-one
million, an increase of more than one-quarter since 1975. 73 As their
numbers grow, older Americans will demand and receive an increasing
amount of governmental attention. Land use decisions to protect and
preserve the chosen lifestyle of senior citizens are already being sought
and debated, and the law appears to be moving in the direction of al-
lowing protective planning such as senior citizen zoning and adults-
only apartments to be put into effect by cities and counties.
As discussed briefly above,74 the state of New Jersey is in the fore-
front of this debate. The advocates of open and reasonably priced
housing have faced off against local governmental and senior citizens
groups seeking to protect their rights to live in special areas responsive
72. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEMOGRAPHIC As-
PECTS OF AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-11 (rev. January
1978).
73. The population 60 and over numbered 4.9 million in 1900. By 1930, the group
had more than doubled in size to 10.5 million. It approximately tripled again to
31.6 million in 1975. In the year 2000, the number is expected to be about 41
million, or over one-quarter greater than in 1975. Decennial growth rates for the
population 60 and over approximate 30 percent between 1920 and 1960, but then
they began a declining trend which is expected to bring the figure down to about 4
percent in the decade 1990-2000.
Id. at 3. Our older population continues to grow as a share of total population:
From 1900 to 1975 the proportion of the population 60 years and older more than
doubled. . . . Whether this group's share will decline, remain about the same, or
continue to increase in the future depends principally on the future course of fertil-
ity. The proportion is now expected to fall between 14.1 percent and 16.6 percent
at the end of this century.
Id. at 6. This decline is due to the rapid drop in the number of births during the '20's and
the Depression, and the fact that this smaller number is now moving into senior citizen
status. Id. at 4. While the absolute number of older persons is still rapidly increasing, it is
interesting to note this caveat by the Census Bureau based on its projections:
Obviously, statements sometimes made in the press and elsewhere that over one-
third of the population of the United States will be over 65 years of age in another
quarter to half century are unfounded. This would be "possible" only if fertility
continued at replacement or subreplacement levels and death rates at the higher
ages were reduced to zero or near zero in the next few years.
Id. at 10.
74. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
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to their special needs. In two 1976 companion cases, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey proided a useful and detailed analysis and de-
fense of the legitimacy of age restricted zoning.
In Shepard v. Woodland Township Committee & Planning Board,75
the court upheld zoning for planned unit developments for the elderly
as a constitutional exercise of the police power. The court in a unani-
mous decision stated that the zoning ordinance "serves the peculiar
housing needs of the elderly by authorizing the construction of spe-
cially-designed housing for this segment of the population. In so. doing,
it clearly promotes the general welfare of both the township and the
region at large."76
The Woodland Township ordinance restricted permanent resi-
dency in senior citizen communities to persons at least fifty-two years
old, except that one child above the age of nineteen could reside with
his parents or guardians. It further limited full time occupancy of any
dwelling unit to no more than three individuals.77 These age and occu-
pancy qualifications were specifically validated by the court. In declin-
ing to adopt a narrow view of the zoning power which would prevent
municipalities from regulating, at least collaterally, "those who may
use the land" as well as the more traditional regulation of "thephysical
and structural aspects of land use," the court concluded that "ordi-
nances which regulate use by regulating the identified user are not in-
herently objectionable so long as the distinctions which they draw are
reasonable and the conditions they impose bear a real and substantial
relationship to regulatibn of land use."
78
As a final display of its willingness to practice judicial restraint
and avoid the essentially political questions which underlie age restric-
75. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
76. Id. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012-13. The ordinance enacted by Woodland Township
contained "height and bedroom restrictions" to "assure the construction of small, easily
manageable, single-level units with a minimum of stairs. . . ." Id. at 240, 364 A.2d at 1011.
Recreation facilities such as clubhouses, shuffleboard courts and swimming pools were also
mandatory under the ordinance. These special design and improvement requirements were
important to the New Jersey Supreme Court in sustaining the zoning. The court quoted at
unusual length from sociological and demographic works regarding the specific needs of the
elderly and the retired, apparently as part of its examination of the rational relationship
between the restrictions in the ordinance and the appropriate state interest furthered
thereby. Id. at 247, 364 A.2d at 1015. The opinion provides excellent sources for cities and
counties seeking factual material on which to base an age restriction ordinance. Id. at 239-
40 n.7, 240-41 n.8, 241-42 nn.9 & 10, 364 A.2d at 1010 n.7, 1011 n.8, 1012 nn.9 & 10.
77. Id. at 244, 364 A.2d at 1013.
78. Id. at 244-45, 364 A.2d at 1013 (citing Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71
N.J. 249, 278-79, 364 A.2d 1016, 1032 (1976)).
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tion ordinances, the court quoted at length from Norman Williams'
treatise on American land planning law:
[L]and use decisions often have major social consequences,
and these latter are often quite as important as their physical
impact; they may in fact be more important. It is completely
unrealistic, and in fact a little absurd, to try to insist that, in
making such decisions, public officials should ignore such
consequences; they will quite reasonably point out that it is
their responsibility to take them into account. . . .Again, it is
a major question to decide whether the aged should live in spe-
cial segregated areas, or scattered among the general popula-
tion,- a decision on this is likely to be phrased in terms of a land-
use decision. Why should the courts invoke judge-made policy
to preclude responsible local officials from implementing such
policies?
79
In a unanimous companion decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld a Weymouth Township ordinance creating a zoning dis-
trict permitting mobile home parks for the exclusive use of the eld-
erly. 0 The court again reviewed demographics, 81 sociology, 8 2 and the
special needs of the elderly,83 and found that the ordinance promoted
79. Id. at 248, 364 A.2d at 1015-16 (emphasis in original) (quoting I N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 1. 11, at 22 (1974)).
80. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
81. See id. at 266-67, 364 A.2d at 1025-26.
82. The court commented on the special social and psychological needs of the elderly:
The elderly are apt to be less mobile than younger persons. They may have
lost friends and relatives of comparable age and background. As a result, readily
accessible companionship becomes increasingly important to them. In addition,
the fact that children may have moved away sometimes causes elderly persons to
seek an age-homogeneous environment to replace broken family ties. . . . Such
an environment also helps older citizens to adjust to the social and psychological
effects of retirement. . . . If the retiree decides to move, he may seek an adjust-
ment not only in his housing consumption but also in his residential or community
environment. He may well seek out a community where leisure is not denigrated
and where peer contact is maximized. The importance of the psychological aspects
of retirement suggests that retired adults may consider the environmental aspects
of housing as much if not more than structural aspects. Thus, leisure oriented, age-
defined housing environments are particularly attractive to the retired and eld-
erly. ...
In addition, age-homogeneous communities afford a sense of security to their
residents and thereby reduce the fear of criminal victimization. . . . Finally, these
communities facilitate social relations and increase opportunities for the peer con-
tact which many older persons need and desire. . ..
Id. at 270-71, 364 A.2d at 1027-28 (citations omitted).
83. The court recognized that there are special economic and physical needs in provid-
ing housing for the elderly:
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the general welfare 4 on a rational basis." In addition, the court ex-
pressed its concern about the relationship between age restricted zoning
and the type of exclusionary zoning it struck down a year earlier in its
Mount Laurel decision,86 but concluded that the needs and desires of
the elderly are as appropriate a consideration for municipal land plan-
ners as are the needs of younger families with children.
87
In part the need of the elderly for specialized housing results from the fixed
and limited incomes upon which many older persons are dependent .... Because
many of the elderly derive their incomes from pensions, social security or other
government benefit programs, or from interest on savings or income-producing se-
curities, they are among those hardest hit by inflation and the current statewide
housing shortage. . . . Consequently, many of the elderly cannot afford housing
specifically designed for their needs, and in many cases are actually obliged to live
in substandard housing. ... Many others must devote a disproportionate amount
of their available resources to housing costs. . . . Moreover, those who are home-
owners must often forego proper maintenance and upkeep of their homes ...
In part, though, the need for specialized housing transcends economic status
and results from the particular physical and social problems of the elderly. The
desirability of housing to meet the special physical needs of the elderly is summa-
rized in a report by the New Jersey Office on Aging:
The needs of the elderly differ from those of the rest of the general popu-
lace; muscles and skin become less pliable with increased age, bones be-
come more brittle, and hearing and sight begin to fail. The older person
has difficulty in performing normal home maintenance tasks.
To the elderly, accidents in the home are a real danger. Falls, for example, are the
leading cause of accidental death for those 65 and over. Throw rugs, stairs and
many other objects can cause serious accidents. Older people have different needs,
and housing is one area where special consideration must be given. Plans should
include more and wider walkways with fewer stairs, an interior and exterior
designed to permit easy social contact, provision for common rooms, short dis-
tances between buildings, easy refuse collection, little maintenance, and well-
lighted walkways and halls.
In addition, housing designed for the elderly should include such facilities as a
central dining room, health care facilities and recreational facilities ...
Id. at 268-69, 364 A.2d at 1026-27 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030.
85. Relying on Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), for the
proposition that housing is not one of the fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth
amendment, the court concluded that "neither 'fundamental' rights nor 'suspect' criteria for
classification are implicated in the present matter." Therefore, "plaintiffs have the burden of
demonstrating herein that the classification lacks a rational basis." Id. at 283, 364 A.2d at
1034. The court goes on to review state and federal authorities and to determine that age
restrictions on housing occupancy can have a rational basis. Id. at 284-87, 364 A.2d at 1035-
37.
86. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975). In Mount Laurel, the court concluded that a zoning ordinance that
permitted only single-family detached dwellings with restrictions on lot size was contrary to
the general welfare. Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730. A municipality may not exclude low and
moderate income housing by such a system of land use regulation. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at
724.
87. The court in Weymouth distinguished Mount Laurels invalid single-family ordi-
nance:
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California case law has not developed the extensive authority for
age restricted zoning that New Jersey has, perhaps because the concept
has been implemented so infrequently in California that no court tests
have yet reached the appellate level. However, there is no reason why
the New Jersey authorities are inappropriate. The basic constitutional
and statutory structure enabling local governments to zone for the gen-
eral welfare is similar in both states. The judiciary of both states has
taken a similarly broad approach to the review of local zoning ordi-
nances. Therefore, it appears that in California, land use restrictions
based on age are permissible if due process and equal protection con-
cerns are met. In the absence of preemption, a legislative body is free
to serve its own particular view of the public interest, and, within the
Our decision in Mt. Laurel requires developing municipalities to provide, by
their land use regulations, the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing for all categories of persons who may desire to live there ...
This task would be impossible if the municipality could not design its land use
regulations to provide for the unsatisfied housing needs of specific, narrowly de-
fined categories of people. While we were specifically concerned in Mt. Laurel
with the needs of younger families with children, the elderly are also a segment of
the population whose needs and desires are appropriate considerations for munici-
pal land use planning. Therefore, to the extent that such needs exist, planning
housing developments for the elderly may serve an inclusionary, rather than exclu-
sionary function ...
71 N.J. at 293-94, 364 A.2d at 1040 (citations omitted).
It is important to note that plaintiffs in Weymouth apparently did not attack the ordi-
nance on Mount Laurel-type exclusionary grounds. In spite of this, the New Jersey Supreme
Court reconciled its Weymouth, Shepard, and Mount Laurel holdings and at the same time
"reemphasize[d] [its] concern about the exclusionary potential which zoning for senior citi-
zen housing possesses." Id. at 295, 364 A.2d at 1040-41. Another New Jersey plaintiff may
feel invited by this language to test an age restricted zone on exclusionary grounds.
In a more recent New Jersey test of a local zoning ordinance, State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99,
405 A.2d 368 (1979), an ordinance which restricted housing occupancy to no more than four
unrelated individuals was struck down by the same court as a violation of due process under
the New Jersey Constitution. By using the state's due process clause, the court was able to
disregard the United States Supreme Court's validation of a somewhat similar ordinance in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Baker, the court found that an ordi-
nance requiring set biological or legal relationships among occupants of one household in-
fringes unnecessarily upon freedom and privacy, while at the same time there are more
effective traditional methods of controlling congestion and overcrowding, the ostensible pur-
poses of the ordinance. 81 N.J. at 110, 114, 405 A.2d at 373, 375. In the Baker opinion,
Weymouth is mentioned only in passing and Shepard not at all. Thus, it is probably fair to
say that the New Jersey Supreme Court does not consider age zoning as a restriction "based
upon legal or biological relationships" permissible within a home, but instead as a milder
restriction on those who may use land for a home in a certain area. .d. at 111, 405 A.2d at
373. Once the family unit is established in such an area pursuant to such age restriction, the
government cannot intrude into the biological or legal relationships between members of
that family, at least in New Jersey. Whether swinging senior singles or fertile octogenarians
are free to heed this implied invitation to establish their own communes within age restricted
communities will depend on subsequent case law or statutory developments.
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limits that have been discussed, legislate in the area of age restricted
land use.
Two recent California developments in this area are of interest in
reviewing the nature and extent of this broad authority. First, a zoning
ordinance has been successfully utilized to insure an age restricted re-
tirement community for senior citizens in Sun City, California. Sec-
ond, local legislation regulating adults-only apartments has been
adopted and state legislation prohibiting such apartments has been de-
feated.
A. Sun City, Caiornia
In the early 1960's, the Del Webb Corporation began the develop-
ment and sale of homes and lots in a proposed new retirement commu-
nity in western Riverside County. Called "Sun City" and patterned
after similar senior citizen developments in Arizona and Florida, the
concept proved successful. From a population in the area of well under
1,000 in 1960, the community had grown to almost 8,000 by early
1978.88 Residents support a full range of recreational activities tradi-
tionally enjoyed by retired persons, such as golf, swimming, shuffle-
board, bowling, whist drives, and bridge and bingo tournaments as well
as many other similar events organized under the auspices of the local
community center. The electric cart and the three-wheeled cycle are
common sights on the long, winding residential streets of single-family
homes and duplexes with minimum maintenance landscaping. A quiet,
relaxed atmosphere prevails.
Residents realized their haven was threatened in 1976 when they
discovered that they had no legal means to assure that Sun City would
continue as a retirement community populated by senior citizens. The
original developers, apparently because of legal concerns,89 had sold
88. 1978 Riverside County Special Census Report, at 15; Interview with Mark Bayls,
Supervising Planner, Riverside County Planning Department, in Riverside, March 19, 1980.
According to the same Special Report, in 1978 there were 4,949 dwelling units in the Sun
City area, with a resulting population per dwelling unit of 1.59 persons. This is one of the
lowest ratios in Riverside County and demonstrates a typical characteristic of a senior citi-
zen community.
89. Lazzareschi, It Isn't that Sun City Folks Hate Children..., Riverside Press-Enter-
prise, May 15, 1977, at C-I, col. 2. Such concern has been widely shared among developers
of retirement communities. See, for example, the covenants, conditions, and restrictions on
Woodburn Senior Estates No. 7, a community for older persons in Woodburn, Oregon, as
recorded on May 11, 1966, at v. 616, p. 456, Deed Records, Marion County, Oregon, along
with the letter from Henry Dobson, Director of Senior Estates Golf & Country Club, to
Melville Hirschi, Esq., January 14, 1977 (on file at the office of the Loyola Law Review); the
covenants, conditions, and restrictions in 1966 contained no age restrictions, and Mr. Dob-
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the original lots and homes without deed restrictions covering age or
children. Subsequent purchasers had continued the practice, and even
though all concerned had shared the concept of Sun City as a senior
citizen community, there were no enforceable guaranties that this
would continue. As residents began to read of housing shortages and
housing prices for young families in the Los Angeles metropolitan area
just over an hour's drive to the west, and as they began to see children
and teenagers in residential areas of town, they became increasingly
concerned about their ability to protect the quality and style of life they
thought they had bought and assured.
These concerns were translated into political action. Despite its
name, Sun City is not a city under California law; instead, it is an unin-
corporated area of the County of Riverside. As such, the County
Board of Supervisors makes land use policy and zoning decisions for
the area. In 1977, hundreds of Sun City residents petitioned the county
for the establishment of an age restricted zone and the imposition of
that zone on the residential areas of their community. Over the opposi-
tion of the Planning Commission, its staff, and the County Counsel,90
the Board of Supervisors in early 1978 enacted an ordinance zoning
Sun City's residential areas to require occupancy by residents at least
one of whom is fifty years of age or older. Further, the ordinance pre-
vents persons under eighteen years of age from residing permanently in
the area. The ordinance was enacted as a traditional zoning regulation
pursuant to the police power, and applies the zone text set forth as Sec-
tion 18.7 of Ordinance 348, the Land Use Ordinance of the County of
Riverside, California. 91
son eleven years later cited continuing concerns on the part of counsel and stated that no
protective amendments had yet been made. The authors hope that this article will assist in
allaying such fears.
90. This opposition was centered on objections to "social zoning" and enforcement con-
cerns by the Planning Department (Letter from Riverside County Planning Department to
Riverside County Board of Supervisors, July 6, 1977) and on doubts as to legal validity,
predictions of enforcement problems, concerns about a "proliferation of requests" from
other groups, and on the fact that Sun City already existed, would have to be rezoned, and
that allegations by existing landowners of an unlawful taking without just compensation
could then be made (Letter from Office of Riverside County Counsel to Riverside County
Board of Supervisors, July 7, 1977) (both letters on file at the office of the Loyola Law
Review).
91. The new zone text allowing zoning for senior citizen developments follows an over-
lay concept and reads:
Whenever a planned residential development for senior citizens has been con-
structed .... or, whenever the Board [of Supervisors] determines that an area
should be considered for senior citizen zoning, the area may be set for hearing...
to consider zoning that would limit the occupancy of dwelling units ... to the
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The ordinance has not been challenged, and no prosecutions for its
violation have occurred.92 The streets of Sun City remain quiet, and
the overwhelming majority of residents appear to be pleased with the
new security afforded to the chosen uses of their land.
93
B. Adults-only apartments
Accepting the legal premise that local California governments can
legislate in the area of age restricted land use can have major implica-
tions for residential land uses other than retirement communities. Just
as the Sun City property owner can have his expectations regarding the
age of his neighbors and his successors in title protected by a Riverside
County ordinance, so can a Los Angeles property owner have his ex-
pectations for occupancy of his apartment house by adult tenants
thwarted by a local ordinance. The same legal basis which allows age
restricted zoning in Sun City would allow adults-only apartments to be
prohibited by ordinance in the city of Los Angeles.
There is of course a real difference between a traditional zoning
ordinance which permits only certain uses of land within a given geo-
graphic area, and an anti-discrimination ordinance which prohibits re-
strictions on the use of a particular parcel of land. However, both are
grounded in the police power, and both as enacted will probably con-
tain remarkably similar provisions regarding the need for the law in
question to protect the public welfare as the particular city council or
county board of supervisors views it.
94
hereinafter listed minimum ages. Whenever the zoning symbol in a zone classifica-
tion. . . is followed by the initials "S.C.D." (Example: R-I-S.C.D.), each dwelling
unit in the area so zoned, that is occupied, shall be occupied by at least one person
not less than 50 years of age and no person under 18 years of age shall permanently
reside in any dwelling unit in the zoned area.
It was added to the Land Use Ordinance by Ordinance No. 348.1626, which went into effect
March 13, 1978. The rezoning of Sun City was effected by Ordinance No. 348.1670, which
went into effect October 10, 1978.
92. Interview with The Hon. Clayton Record, Riverside County Supervisor representing
Sun City, in Riverside (January 10, 1980).
93. Id.
94. In Consolidated Rock, the California Supreme Court stated that the "primary pur-
pose of comprehensive zoning is to protect others, and the general public, from uses of prop-
erty which will, if permitted, prove injurious to them." 57 Cal. 2d at 524, 370 P.2d at 348, 20
Cal. Rptr. at 644.
Further, both the police power and the protection of others from uses of property which
would prove injurious underpin the local ordinances now being considered and adopted to
prevent adults-only apartments. See, for example, the typical findings made by the Santa
Monica City Council in its Ordinance 1139, entitled "To Regulate Discrimination in Hous-
ing Based on Age" (the existence of "arbitrary discrimination against tenants with minor
children poses a substantial threat to the public health and welfare of a large segment of the
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Legislation over the past twenty years has greatly limited land-
lords' discretion in choosing tenants. Discrimination between and
among tenants based upon their sex, color, religion, ancestry, or na-
tional origin is illegal in California. One of the remaining legitimate
grounds for choice is age.96
Many landlords97 have decided that they can obtain either lower
community, namely, families with children"). SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE § 4700(a)
& 4700(b). See also CITY OF DAVIS CODE § 12A-17, CITY OF Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL
CODE § 45.50; SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL CODE (POLICE CODE) art. 1.2, § 100; and CITY
OF BERKELEY MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.24.010. This language owes as much to Miller and to
Consolidated Rock as does the typical recital in a zoning ordinance.
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1979), often cited as the Unruh Civil Rights Act, states
that:
All persons are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, color, religion, ances-
try, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advan-
tages, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person
which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of
every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1979), now called the Fair Hous-
ing Law and formerly known as the Rumford Fair Housing Act, prevents discrimination in
housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry.
96. Neither the Unruh Civil Rights Act nor the Fair Housing Law prohibit landlord-
tenant discrimination on the basis of age. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 35742; Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 97 Cal. App. 3d 278, 285-89 (1979), hearing
granted, Dec. 6, 1979. See Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 703, 98
Cal. Rptr. 644, 645 (1971) (regulation of tenants' ages is apparently still viable). For an
amplification of the kinds of discrimination permitted and prohibited by the Unruh Act,
compare Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976) (serv-
ing a tenant with a notice to quit because of her activities in organizing tenants to protest a
rent increase not prohibited) with In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216-18, 474 P.2d 999-1000, 90
Cal. Rptr. 24, 31-32 (1970) (exclusion of prospective customer because of his long hair and
unconventional dress "arbitrary" and therefore prohibited).
97. There is a shortage of rental housing available in California to tenants with children.
A 1977 study by the staff of the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)
concludes that more than half of all renter families with children are inadequately housed,
and that this housing problem affects nearly one-fourth of all families with children. SCAG
INADEQUATELY HOUSED FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 1-8 (Sept. 1977) (a supplemental staff
report to SCAG's Regional Housing Allocation Model). A group known as the Fair Hous-
ing for Children Coalition has reported that 7 1% of the City of Los Angeles' apartment units
are "off limits to families with children. . . ." The Apartment Association of Los Angeles
disputes this statistic; its spokesman puts the figure at 35%. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 15,
1980, at 1, col. 1. Findings by the City Councils of Davis and Berkeley and the County
Board of Supervisors of San Francisco indicate similar shortages in Northern California.
CODE OF THE CITY OF DAVIS § 12A-17; BERKELEY MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.24.101; SAN
FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL CODE (POLICE CODE) pt. II, ch. VII, art. 1.2, § 100.
The shortage of rental housing apparently extends nationwide and faces all tenants, not
just those with children. "The nation's inventory of rental housing is declining. Michael
Sumichrast, chief economist of the National Association of Home Builders, has calculated
that the supply is diminishing at a rate of 2% a year." ROBERT A. McNEIL CORP., THE
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vacancy rates or higher tenant satisfaction and rents by restricting their
apartments to occupancy by adults.98 At the same time, the number of
families with children seeking "to find adequate shelter at reasonable
cost in a community of their choice"99 has increased dramatically, and
the two competing interests are leading to repeated political confronta-
tions. 1o
The cities of Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Berkeley, and Davis, the
City and County of San Francisco, and the County of Santa Clara have
enacted ordinances prohibiting adults-only apartments. 10' The County
of Los Angeles has considered and rejected such an ordinance, thereby
at least by implication allowing whatever landlord-tenant age discrimi-
nation exists in that jurisdiction to continue. At least two other juris-
dictions, the County of Riverside and the State of Arizona, have
enacted laws expressly allowing landowners to discriminate on the ba-
sis of age.'
0 2
AMERICAN HOUSING MARKET: A NATIONAL VIEw 5 (1979). As an example of this decline,
the McNeil report states that the "increase in non-subsidized, privately owned rental units in
1978 was less than the number of units lost through conversion to condominiums and by
other changes in the available supply of rental housing." Id. The reason for this decline is
apparently found in the greater financial benefits which can be realized by developing new
single-family homes instead of apartments. The median sales price of new homes has in-
creased from $18,000 in 1963 to $62,400 in April of 1979. This increase was greater than the
rise in construction costs, cost of living, or median income during the same period. Con-
versely, rents have increased more slowly, and have fallen behind the rate of inflation. Id. at
5-8. With the dual spectres of rent control and record high interest rates, it is not difficult to
predict which form of housing the self-interested developer will choose to build.
98. Such exclusion of children is generally accomplished in the lease document either by
indirection (i.e., "The premises are to be used as a private residence for not more than -
adults and for no other purpose without the written consent of the landlord") or by bold
assertion (i.e., "No children or pets"). Compare the lease provision used by the parties in
Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 281, with Section 7 of the 1978 Revised
Form Lease and Section 7 of the 1977 Revised Form Rental Agreement promulgated by the
California Association of Realtors, 505 Shatto Place, Los Angeles, California 90020.
99. Senate Bill 440 as amended, Reg. Sess. 2 (1979-80).
100. Packard, The Graying of,4merica: Beyondthe Baby Boom, Los Angeles Times, Dec.
4, 1979, part V, at 1, col. 4. See also Campaign Against Adults-Only Housing Growing in
California, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 14, 1979, part I, at 3.
101. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 9, 1980, at 2, col. I.
102. Section 18.7, Ordinance 348, County of Riverside, California; ARIZ. Rav. STATS.
§ 33-303B (1975). The Arizona statute states:
No person shall rent or lease his property to another in violation of a valid
restrictive covenant against the sale of such property to persons who have a child
or children living with them nor shall a person rent or lease his property to persons
who have a child or children living with them when his property lies within a
subdivision which subdivision is presently designed, advertised and used as an ex-
clusive adult subdivision. A person who rents his property in violation of the pro-
visions of this subsection is guilty of a petty offense.
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In order to enact a uniform rule statewide and to protect tenants
with children, seven California state legislators with urban constituen-
cies introduced Senate Bill 440 on February 22, 1979.103 The legisla-
tion attempted to amend the state's Unruh Act to add discrimination
against tenants with minor children to the list of prohibited choices by
landlords. Similar bills had failed several times previously, 104 and Sen-
ate Bill 440 proved no more successful. Despite limiting amendments
designed to improve its political palatability, the bill languished in the
State Senate's inactive file for several months while its author at-
tempted to marshall support. Finally, when time was about to run out
for 1979 bills to pass their house of origin, Senator Roberti brought the
bill before the Senate as a special order of business on January 25,
1980. This red carpet treatment failed to impress suburban and rural
legislators, and the bill failed to pass. Despite subsequent efforts to
resuscitate the bill, it later died for another session.105 Therefore, local
ordinances remain the only means in California to prohibit residential
age restrictions, just as they are the only practical means of enforcing
residential age restrictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is ample legal authority for a local or state legislative body
either to enact residential age restrictions or to prohibit such restric-
tions. For reasons of political accountability and economy of enforce-
ment, local zoning ordinances appear to be the best means to achieve or
block these restrictions. Courts so far have shown a willingness to up-
hold such ordinances when they are properly enacted and supported.
103. The principal author of this legislation is Senator David Roberti (D-Los Angeles).
104. Senate Bills 359 and 1688 of the 1977-78 California Legislative Session and Assem-
bly Bill 1954 of the 1975-76 Session.
105. The state Senate vote on S.B. 440 was 18 ayes and 17 noes. Senate Weekly History,
Jan. 31, 1980, at 260. Twenty-one votes, a simple majority of the Senate, are needed to pass
out a bill.
The findings set forth in the bill are similar to the findings made by California cities and
counties in their own ordinances prohibiting age restrictions on apartments. Family stabil-
ity, protection against arbitrary discrimination, and preservation of natural community di-
versity are the stated goals of the bill. It is hard to believe that a majority of the members of
the California State Senate does not support these goals. Therefore, it is at least possible
that some of the senators not supporting S.B. 440 felt the matter better handled at the local
level by zoning authorities closer to individual neighborhoods and community concerns. It
is also possible that these senators read the Field Research Corporation poll which was
conducted for the California Apartment Association and was disseminated one week before
the vote on S.B. 440. Mervin Field stated therein that 75% of the Californians polled op-
posed the prohibition of adults-only apartments, and 85% supported the rights of adults to
live in such apartments. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1980, part I, at 28, col. 1-2.
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While all prohibitions of adults-only housing to date in California
have contained recitals against discrimination and therefore do not ap-
pear similar to zoning ordinances, they must be grounded in the police
power in order to stand. Therefore, they are permitted forms of local
regulation on the same basis as is zoning. Such ordinances may prove
more viable when attacked if they have been expressly enacted as zon-
ing ordinances.

